Africa in 2026 The 11 trends/factors that will shape African affairs in 2026

I: Economics

(1) African economies will register strong nominal growth in 2026. But many countries in the region will struggle to convert that growth into noticeable human development (including through the creation of reliable jobs).

For the first time in recent history, in 2026 African growth will outpace Asia’s. The difference won’t be by much, 4.4% vs. 4.1%; and it will be driven by commodities (especially metals). But it’s noteworthy that after the COVID hiatus, African economies are back to extending the more than 25 years of successive expansion registered before COVID. That is a good thing.

Source: African Development Bank

Growth, and the related positive vibes (and we all know vibes matter a lot when it comes to Africa), mean that even economies that have been struggling lately can have some breathing room. Buoyed by gold prices, Ghana’s cedi saw its first annual gain against the dollar since at least 1994; with the country now able to attract foreign creditors again after its recent default. The same is true for Ethiopia — which looks set to come out of its default and continue with its macro reforms. Even Zambia, which plans to triple copper output in six years, is finally shedding the stigma of default (although it still faces significant economic headwinds — see below).

Growth means that African economies’ ability to sustainably rollover debt is improving. Source: African Development Bank

While I would prefer to see the region’s economies get closer to 12% annual growth that translates into job creation and broad-based human development, any and all growth is welcome at this point. Growth — especially in difficult times and places — is what will focus minds on more material expansion as not only a possibility, but a necessary inevitability. Growth will then beget the modernizing cultures of growth and progress that the Continent desperately needs at this point in its history.

Source: Our World in Data

Notably, economic growth will also translate into ever increasing per capita incomes.

Now, it is true that Africa is quickly becoming the last region with entrenched endemic poverty. However, this outcome is not preordained. Human agency can prevent it from becoming a reality. And that process starts with sustained growth, especially in difficult times like these. In addition, slowing population growth in the region (largely on the back of higher education attainment for girls, urbanization, and ongoing transition from agriculture) will mechanically result in rising per capita incomes. Income inequality will still be a problem, for sure. But it’s undeniable that rising median ages and lower dependency ratios will result in marginally better human development indicators.

Notice that the rate of economic growth will continue to outpace population growth.

It’s always worth remembering that while Africa’s population is still growing faster than in other world regions, peak growth was in the 1980s. And since the mid 2010s growth rates have been on a steady decline. Source: Worldometer

(2) Failure to effectively manage scarce natural resources will continue to exact high costs on African economies in 2026. Gold smuggling as well as policy missteps in the metals and agricultural commodity sectors will depress government revenue windfalls in a likely bumper year.

An often-ignored fact in African economic history is the awful timing of the post-independence commodity cycles.

As Thandika Mkandawire observed, there was very little that (admittedly flawed) African policymakers could do to influence these external factors. However, the inability to game commodity cycles didn’t also mean total lack of control over policy related to commodities. That’s where policymakers failed. Their preferred models of resource exploitation created enclave sectors with minimal developmental impact. Property rights never developed to support domestic private investments in the sector. Value addition was rarely considered. Profits mostly accrued to foreigners with no intention of reinvesting in African economies. Importantly, planning was poor and governments spent like prices would never crash — a weakness that persists to this day. For example, poor policymaking meant that Nigeria missed out on the last oil boom.

This flaw is particularly costly if one understands that, in relative terms, Africa is not that mineral rich. Back in 2023 I argued that Africa’s accessible resource wealth tends to be vastly overstated:

It is important to put African state’s natural resource wealth in global perspective. Despite having almost 17% of the world’s population, in 2019 Africa accounted for a mere 5.5% of global mineral output. As shown below, Africa’s share of global mineral output peaked in 2005. Part of the reason is historical under-investment in prospecting and development, as well as transfer pricing by tax dodging foreign firms. In 2019 only two Africans countries (South Africa, 8; Nigeria 17) appeared in the top 20 global mineral producers by value.

Source: An Africanist Perspective

….. it doesn’t matter what is in the ground. In order to realize the value of the continent’s resource potential it has to be extracted, sold on the global market at a fair price, and the taxes/royalties accrued by public authorities invested in improving human welfare.

More people should be aware of this fact. Delusions of unlimited African riches that are being stolen by the corrupt elites and their foreign allies is copium that limits the region’s leading minds from honestly assessing the Continent’s resource sector. It also robs African private investors of the legitimacy to invest in and create wealth from the region’s resources. To reiterate, the resulting dominant model of public ownership unnecessarily empowers foreign firms and reinforces the enclaving of Africa’s resource sector.

Which is why I was glad to see this recent excellent piece by Bright Simons injecting sobriety into the “critical minerals” discourse:

For decades, a stubborn statistic has haunted conversations about Africa’s wealth and poverty: the claim that the continent holds 30% of the world’s mineral reserves. It is repeated so often that even UN agencies and major development banks cite it as gospel…. The figure is irresistible because it flatters both ends of the ideological spectrum. Pan-African optimists see it as proof that the continent is on the cusp of global power, if only it would “leverage” its buried treasure. Neo-pessimists, including some in Western think-tank circuits, see it as the ultimate indictment: how could a region so rich remain so poor?

When “critical minerals” entered the global lexicon, the old myth received a fresh coat of varnish. Suddenly, Africa was said to possess “30% of the world’s critical minerals”. Now that “rare earth minerals” are highly sought after, Africa’s 30% sauce has come in handy, yet again.

In reality…

Africa holds under 2% of rare-earth output and patchy projects won’t change that soon. The prize is nearer home: steel inputs, cement additives and battery precursors to power factories, not slogans.

In short, the Continent is not that mineral rich in relative terms. Granted, this situation could change with more prospecting and commercialization, but we are simply not there yet. Consequently, it is vital that whatever is currently being produced should be properly managed.

Yet what we see is an almost uniform lack of official strategic thinking about Africa’s resource sector. For example, as gold prices surged, policymakers let smuggling boom. Ghana saw $11.4b worth of gold disappear between 2019-2023. Madagascar, an economy that desperately needs all the revenue income it can get, recently lost almost $3b in smuggled gold. The same lack of strategic thinking is evident in the critical minerals sector. Here, it is worth quoting Simons at length:

Africa’s mineral landscape is not a geopolitical prize waiting to be seized; it is a patchwork of small producers and half-built processing dreams punctuated by the occasional grandeur. Projects stall because of unreliable power, opaque licensing and financing structures that pledge future output to foreign offtakers without any strategic game plan.

…. For example, it is not all that relevant to define Africa’s policy direction based on what other regions, like the US, have